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Given that the order was not entered within the requirements of
the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether
Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid
order of extension?
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On page 3, in the Section entitled, STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS
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POINT IV:

If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's
probation on July 6, 1996, and the order was entered within the limits
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(1)

Whether, in entering the order, the Court violated the
Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th
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Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th
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the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether
Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid
order of extension?
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

j
|
|
j
|
j
j
j

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
CAPRICE T. MARTIN,
Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF
Court of Appeal Case # 970501
District Court
Case No. 931900803

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah R. Crim. Pr.
26(2)(a) and Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(f)(Supp. 1995), whereby the defendant in a
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for
anything other than a first degree or capital felony. Appellant was convicted of Robbery, a
Second Degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-6-301, on May 9th, 1994.
Then, Defendant was sentenced to one year to fifteen years in the State penitentiary, with such
sentence being suspended and the Defendant being placed on probation. On June 30, 1997,
the Defendant's probation was revoked and the suspended sentence was imposed.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
POINT I:

Whether the Court's Findings of Facts as to Defendant's knowledge of
his rights were clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the
evidence?

l

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A Trial Courts findings of fact in a criminal case

are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State of Utah v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786,
787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear
weight of the evidence. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However,
Deference to the trial court findings can only be extended when the trial court's factual
findings adequately reveal the steps by which the ultimate conclusion is reached. State v.
Genovesi. 871 P.2d 547, 549-51. (Utah App. 1994).

POINT II:

Whether the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's
probation at June 27th hearing, given that, legally, no order was entered
before Defendant's probation expired by the terms of the order entered
January 6, 1995?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether the trial court had the authority to extend

Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IcLat 1067.

POINT III: If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's
probation on July 6, 1996, then:

(1)

Whether the order was an invalid extension of Defendant's
probation given that the Court did not enter the order extending
Defendant's probation within the limits imposed by the
legislature?
2

(2)

Given that the extension order was not entered within the limits
imposed by the legislature, whether Defendant's probation
terminated before the entry of a valid order of extension?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether the trial court had the authority to extend

Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. Id,, at 1067.

POINT IV:

If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's
probation on July 6, 1996, and the order was entered within the limits
imposed by the legislature and the due process, then:

(1)

Whether, in entering the order, the Court violated the
Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution?

(2)

Given that the order was not entered within the requirements of
the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether
Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid
order of extension?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether the trial court had the authority to extend

Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no
3

particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. Id. at 1067.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The full tests of the following determinative constitutional provisions and statutes are
reproduced at Appendix A.
A.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

B.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

C.

Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

D.

Utah Code Section 77-18-1.

E.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A,

Nature of the Case.

On May 8, 1997, Defendant CAPRICE MARTIN brought a Motion to Dismiss the
case State of Utah v. Caprice Martin. Case no. 9319 00803 FS. (District Court File, pages
187 - 207). The Court held an evidentiary hearing and Mr. MARTIN produced evidence
which showed that the Court lost jurisdiction on July 6, 1996, because the Defendant's
probation was not legally extended, and thus, expired. (Transcript, May 8, 1997). The Court
ruled that Mr. MARTIN's probation was legally extended, and thus, the Court could consider
the Order to Show Cause to revoke Defendant's probation and imposed the sentence on the
underlying offense. (District Court File, pages 236 - 237). Subsequently, Defendant was
convicted before Judge Homer F. Wilkinson, in case no. 9719 00320 FS, of Escape from the
4

custody of a probation officer, a third degree felony, and assault against a peace officer, a
class A Misdemeanor, said crimes occurring on January 14, 1997. Judge Leslie Lewis found
that the convictions violated the terms and condition of probation in the case State of Utah v.
Caprice Martin. Case no. 9319 00803 FS, revoked probation, and imposed the sentence of one
to fifteen year in the State penitentiary. (District Court file, pages 243, 244).

B.

Course of the Proceeding.

On May 9, 1994, the District Court, the Hon. Frank G. Noel, presiding, entered
judgment, conviction and sentence against the Defendant CAPRICE T. MARTIN. (District
Court File, pages 57, 58). The JUDGMENT provided that "Defendant is granted a stay of the
above prison sentence and placed on probation in the custody of this Court and under the
supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult Parole for the period of 2
years, pursuant to the attached conditions of probation."

(District Court File, pages 57, 58).

On December 20, 1994, an AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE was filed by Defendant's probation officer alleging that Mr. MARTIN violated the
terms and conditions of his probation. (District Court File, pages 65, 66). Also, a
Progress/Violation Report was filed by Adult Probation and Parole. (District Court File,
pages 65 -67). On January 6, 1995, the Defendant admitted allegations 1, 3, & 4, of the
Order to Show Cause filed on December 20th, and allegation #2 was dismissed. (District
Court File, pages 72-73). The Court found that Mr. MARTIN violated the terms of his
probation and Mr. MARTIN'S probation was revoked and reinstated for 18 months running
from January 6, 1995. (District Court File, pages 72-73).
On May 28, 1996, a "Progress/Violation Report" was filed with the Court. (District
Court File, pages 80 - 83). The Progress/Violation Report is signed by Glade Anderson,
5

Probation Officer, and Patricia Dennis, Supervisor. (District Court File, pages 80 - 83) At
the end of the Progress/Violation Report, the document has the words, "APPROVED AND
ORDERED:". (District Court File, pages 80-83, and Exhibit 2) After the words
"APPROVED AND ORDERED", Pat Jones, a Court Clerk, wrote the words 7s/ FGN".
(District Court File, pages 80 - 83, Transcript May 8th Hearing, pages 20:5 - 22:21)
However, there was a copy of the "Progress/Violation Report" signed, after the words
"APPROVED AND ORDERED", by Judge Frank G. Noel, and that original was sent Adult
Probation and Parole. (Transcript, May 8, 1997, Transcript May 8th Hearing, pages 20:5 23:16).
Under the order of January 6, 1995, Mr. MARTIN'S Probation terminated on July 6,
1996. (District Court File, page 72).
On September 30, 1996, Probation Officer Sherry Morgan filed an Affidavit in support
of Order to Show Cause and Order to Show Cause. (District Court File, pages 84, 85). On
October 25, 1996, a hearing was held on the Affidavit. The affidavit alleged that Mr. Martin
failed to pay regularly toward his fine, failed to complete substance abuse treatment, and
committed the offense of Assault, a Class B misdemeanor, on July 10, 1996. (District Court
File, page 84, 85). Mr. Martin admitted allegations 1 2, & 3, and allegation number 4 was
dismissed. (Transcript, October 25, 1996 and District Court File, pages 91). Probation
Officer Morgan argued that Mr. MARTIN'S probation should be re-instated, but the Court did
not determine disposition until June 27, 1997. Transcript, October 25, 1996, District Court
File, pages 91, Transcript of June 27, 1997.)
On March 12, 1997, Mr. MARTIN, by and through his Counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case, State of Utah v. Caprice Martin. Case no. 9319 00803 FS. (District Court
File, pages 187 - 207). Pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss counsel for Mr. MARTIN intended
to call Pat Jones, the court clerk of Judge Frank Noel, and possibly, Judge Noel himself.
6

(District Court File, pages 174 - 182). Thus, by Stipulated Motion, the Hon. Frank Noel
signed an Order recusing himself form the District Court case. (District Court File, pages
208-209).

C.

Evidence established at Evidentiary Hearing on May 8th, 1997.

On May 8, 1997, before the Hon. Leslie Lewis, the Court held an evidentiary hearing
Mr. MARTIN produced evidence which showed that the Court lost jurisdiction on July 6,
1996, because Mr. MARTIN'S probation was not legally extended, and thus, expired.
(Transcript, May 8, 1997). The evidence was as follows:
In March, 1996, Glade Anderson became the probation officer for CAPRICE
MARTIN. (Transcript, May 8th Hearing, 6:4-9). Probation Officer Anderson called
CAPRICE MARTIN and sent Mr. MARTIN a letter. (Transcript, May 8th Hearing, 6:4 - 15)
In response to the letter, Mr. MARTIN contacted Anderson. (Transcript, May 8th Hearing,
6:4 - 15). Officer Anderson first met Mr. MARTIN on May 21, 1996. (Transcript, May
18th Hearing, 7:3-24).
At the May 21st meeting, Probation Officer Anderson showed Mr. MARTIN the
waiver form, (See District Court File, page 82), which was the third page of Exhibit 3.
(Transcript, May 8th Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14). Probation Officer Anderson did not show
Mr. MARTIN the Progress/Violation Report, or discuss the contents of the Progress/Violation
Report which is found in the District Court File, at pages 82, 83. (Transcript, May 8th
Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14, and May 8th hearing, Exhibit 2, pages 1,2)*

1

Exhibit 2 is the same as pages 80, 81, and 82 of the District
Court file. The Discription of Evidence Card, page 223, shows
that the Court received and admitted Exhibit 2, and ordered that
7

The Waiver Form states that "I Caprice Martin . . . do hereby voluntarily request that
my personal appearance before the Third District Court be waived and that my probation
supervision be extended; AND/OR that the conditions of my probation be amended as
follows:" (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3). Then,
the document continues in handwritten language that "Probation extended 12 months from July
6, 1996, for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of substance abuse
counseling." (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3).
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never made aware that he had the
right to receive advice from an attorney. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:13 -18).
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to
require the probation office to show probable cause before he could be held on a hearing for
violation of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 23). Before signing the
Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he was entitled to a neutral officer making
a determination of whether probable cause existed that Mr. MARTIN violated his probation.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 14:4). Before signing the Waiver Form, Mr.
MARTIN was never informed that Adult Probation and Parole had the burden of proof to
show that he willfully violated his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:5 - 14:9).
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to
speak out and present evidence in his own behalf at a probation revocation hearing.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:10 - 14)
Probation Officer Anderson testified that, at the May 21st meeting, Mr. MARTIN was
never shown an Order to Show Cause or Affidavit asserting that Mr. MARTIN violated the

it be placed in the file. Exihibit 2 is the same as Exhibit 3
except that Exhibit 2 is signed u/s/FGN" while Exhbit 3 has Judge
Noel's signature and was sent to AP & P and never filed.
8

terms of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 7:25 - 8:11, 13:9 - 13). The only
persons in attendance at the May 21st meeting were Glade Anderson and CAPRICE MARTIN.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 10:12-15). On May 21, 1996, the only probation condition
that had not yet been met was the verification of payment of the fine and verification of
substance abuse counseling. Everything else was done.

(Transcript of May 8th Hearing,

9:14-19).
Mr. MARTIN'S previous probation officer had focused on the other requirements of
his probation, such as the requirement of achieving a G.E.D., and attending a cognitive
thinking course. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 9:14 - 12:20). Officer Anderson testified
that a probation officer never gives one probationer too many things to do at one time.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 11:12 -12:20) A probation officer is trained to stagger the
requirements of probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 11:12 -12:20).
On May 21, 1996, Probation Officer Anderson was aware that Mr. MARTIN'S
probation was scheduled to terminate in July, 1996.

(Transcript of May 8th Hearing,

18:1-4).
On May 28, 1996, the "Progress/Violation Report" was filed. (District Court File, 80
- 83, and Exhibit 3) The Progress/Violation Report was signed by Glade Anderson and
Patricia Dennis, from Adult Probation and Parole.

(District Court File, 80-83, Transcript

of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18) Neither Glade Anderson nor Patricia Dennis are licensed
to practice law. (Transcript of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18). The document filed in the
District Court file on May 28, 1996, was signed by Pat Jones, using the letters, "/s/FGN".
Transcript of May 8th hearing, 22:12 - 18) The letters "/s/FGN" were place next to the
language "APPROVED AND ORDERED:" on the Progress/Violation Report, at the direction
of Judge Noel.

(District Court File, 80-83, Transcript of May 8th hearing, 20:16 - 24).

Besides the Progress/Violation Report, no other evidence was considered by Judge Noel
9

before he directed his clerk, Pat Jones, to place the letters "/s/FGN" on the Progress/Violation
Report. Further, Judge Noel did not make any findings of fact, whether oral or written, on
record regarding the Progress/Violation Report filed on May 28, 1996. (Transcript of May
8th hearing, 27:25-28:8).

D.

Course of Proceedings after the May 8th hearing.

On May 20, 1997, the Court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(District Court File, page 227 - 234).

Subsequently, Defendant was convicted before Judge

Homer F. Wilkinson, in case no. 9719 00320 FS, of Escape from the custody of a probation
officer, a third degree felony, and assault against a peace officer, a class A Misdemeanor, said
crimes occurring on January 14, 1997. Judge Leslie Lewis found that the convictions violated
the terms and conditions of probation in the case State of Utah v. Caprice Martin. Case no.
9319 00803 FS, and revoked probation, and imposed the sentence of one to fifteen years in the
State penitentiary. (District Court file, pages 243 - 248). The order imposing sentence was
signed by Judge Lewis on June 30, 1997, and Mr. MARTIN appeals from the entry of that
order. (District Court File, pages 243 - 252).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The findings of fact, that Defendant MARTIN knowingly and intelligently waived his
rights to allow an extension of probation, are erroneous and against the clear weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation at June
27th hearing, given that, legally, no order was entered before Defendant's probation expired
by the terms of the order entered January 6, 1995.
10

Further, the Progress/Violation Report signed by Judge Noel's clerk did not enter the
order extending Defendant's probation within the limits of Utah Code Section 77-18-1. Given
that the extension order was not entered within the requirements of Utah Code Section 77-181, Defendant's probation terminated on July 6, 1996. Thus, all other actions taken by the
Court after July 6, 1996, are null and void.
Finally, the Progress/Violation Report signed by Judge Noel's clerk violated the
Defendant MARTIN'S procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th and 14th
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Given that the extension order was not entered within
the requirements of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Defendant's
probation terminated on July 6, 1996. Thus, all other actions taken by the Court after July 6,
1996, are null and void.
For the foregoing reasons, this court should hold that Defendant MARTIN'S probation
was not legally extended within the probation period, and the Court lost jurisdiction over the
case on July 6, 1996. Thus, this Court should remand this case and order the District Court to
vacate the order signed June 30th, 1997, such order revoking Defendant's probation and
entering a sentence of one to fifteen years in the State Penitentiary, and this Court should
order the District Court to dismiss the case.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

Whether the Court's Findings of Facts as to Defendant's knowledge of

his rights were clearly erroneous and against the clear weight of the evidence?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A Trial Courts findings of fact in a criminal case

are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. State of Utah v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786,
787 n.2 (Utah 1988). A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear
11

weight of the evidence. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). However,
deference to the trial court findings can only be extended when the trial court's factual findings
adequately reveal the steps by which the ultimate conclusion is reached. State v. Genovesi.
871 P.2d 547, 549-51. (Utah App. 1994).

In the instant case, the Court entered its findings of fact on the record. (Transcript of
May 8th Hearing, pages 60:4-67:1).

The Court found, on the record, that the waiver in

this case was voluntary and intelligently made. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, page 66:9 10). This finding is clearly erroneous when it is against the clear weight of the evidence.
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
Then, the Court entered a written findings of fact and conclusions of law. (District
Court File, pages 227 - 234). The written finding of facts at paragraphs 9 and 10 are not
supported by the evidence.

Paragraph 9 of the written findings of fact states:
"On May 21, 1996, Defendant knew that an Order to Show Cause proceeding would be
initiated against him if he failed to sign the Waiver of Personal Appearance, knew that
at an Order to Show Cause proceeding he would be entitled at all due process and
access to counsel right available to criminal defendants, knew that he would have the
right to admit or deny any allegations of such an Order to Show Cause, knew that he
would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which the state would have to show,
upon the evidence, to a preponderance standard, that a probation violation had
occurred, and he knew that his probation could be revoked and his original prison
sentence entered if a violation was found." (District Court File, pages 227 - 234).
In fact, the evidence offered at the Evidentiary Hearing of May 8th, 1997, does not
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support the Court making those factual findings or legal conclusions. The testimony of
Probation Officer Glade Anderson was as follows:

"Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

What occurred in that meeting?
He [Caprice Martin] came into our office, I had previously talked to him on the
phone about some substance abuse classes. He came in, we further talked about
him. I had prepared a wavier of appearance before the court. We talked about
that. I had discussed him getting involved in some substance abuse classes. To
my recollection, I referred him to a counselor to undertake those classes, and at
that time he signed the waiver.
Okay. You talked about a progress report. I'm handing you what's to be
marked as Defense Exhibit 2. Would you identify Exhibit Number 2?
This is the progress violation report sent to Judge Noel outlining the request for
the extension of probation, and attached was the waiver of personal appearance.
Is that a true and accurate copy of the document that you showed probationer
Caprice Martin on May 21st, 1996?
As far as the waiver, yes, I believe it is. I did not show him a copy of the
progress violation report.
So then it would be accurate to state that the only document that Caprice Martin
saw was that waiver, which is the third page of Exhibit 2?
Yes.
Was Caprice Martin shown any other documents before he signed that waiver,
which is the third page of Exhibit 2?
I don't believe he was.

THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Let me interject with a question, here. Did you read the
probation violation report, the PVA, to him?
No, Your honor, I did not.
Did you discuss the contents of it with him?
No, we did not.
What did you represent he was waiving by signing the waiver
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document?
THE WITNESS:
I represented that he was waiving his personal appearance before
the court. I believe we talked about an order to show cause, that
one would not be required to - THE COURT:
On what? Did you represent to him what the order to show cause
would have been?
THE WITNESS:
Failure to compete substance abuse classes.
(Transcript May 8th Hearing, pages 7:3-8:24).
Probation Officer Glade Anderson further testified that:
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never made aware that he had the
right to receive advice from an attorney. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:13-18).*
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to
require the probation office to show probable cause before he could be held on a hearing for
violation of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 23). Before signing the
Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he was entitled to a neutral officer making
a determination of whether probable cause existed that Mr. MARTIN violated his probation.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 14:4). Before signing the Waiver Form, Mr.
MARTIN was never informed that Adult Probation and Parole had the burden of proof to
show that he willfully violated his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:5 - 14:9).
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to
speak out and present evidence in his own behalf at a probation revocation hearing.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:10 - 14)
Probation Officer Anderson testified that, at the May 21st meeting, Mr. MARTIN was
never shown an Order to Show Cause or Affidavit asserting that Mr. MARTIN violated the
terms of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 7:25 - 8:11, 13:9 - 13).. On May
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21, 1996, the only probation condition that had not yet been met was the verification of
payment of the fine and verification of substance abuse counseling. Everything else was done.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 9:14-19).

Thus, the Court findings in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the written findings of fact were
clearly erroneous and not supported by the evidence. See State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 93536 (Utah 1994). Further, the Court's findings on the record in the May 8th hearing and in the
written findings that Defendant MARTIN'S waiver of was intelligent, knowing and voluntary
are not supported by the clear weight of the evidence and are clearly erroneous.

See State v.

Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).

POINT II:

Whether the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's
probation on June 27, 1997 given that, legally, no order was entered
before Defendant's probation expired by the terms of the order entered
January 6, 1995?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether the trial court had the authority to extend

Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IcLat 1067.

The record shows, that by order of the Court, Mr. MARTIN'S probation was revoked
and reinstated for 18 months running from January 6, 1995. (District Court File, pages 7273). The Court must commence proceedings to extend, modify, or revoke probation and
must serve notice of those proceedings on Defendant before his probation expires, in order to
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extend, modify, or revoke probation. Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990).

Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that:
"(a)

An Application to the Court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other
than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court
otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it
is made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported by affidavit or
evidence."
(Emphasis added.)

In the instant case, the Court did not entertain a "motion" to extend, modify, or
revoked Defendant's probation prior to the expiration of Defendant's probation on July 6,
1996. And thus, the Court did not, legally, enter an "order" to extend, modify, or revoke
Defendant's probation prior to the expiration of Defendant's probation.
On May 28, 1996, the "Progress/Violation Report" was filed. (District Court File, 80
- 83, and Exhibit 3) The Progress/Violation Report was signed by Glade Anderson and
Patricia Dennis, from Adult Probation and Parole.

(District Court File, 80-83, Transcript

of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18) Neither Glade Anderson nor Patricia Dennis are licensed
to practice law. (Transcript of May 8th hearing, 18:21 - 19:18).
This Court has held that the preparation of Motions and Orders constitutes the practice
of law. See Board of Commissioners. Utah State Bar v. Peterson. 937 P.2d 1263 (Utah
1997). In this case, the Progress/Violation Report was prepared and signed by probation
officers, neither licensed to practice law. However, probation officers are statutorily required
to prepare these reports under Utah Code § 77-18-l(10)(b), which states that:

"The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation
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will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation progress report and
complete report of details on outstanding finds, restitution, and other amounts
outstanding."
These reports are not motions or orders for the purpose of extending, modifying or
revoking probation. See Utah Code § 77-18-l(10)(b). Thus, the most appropriate legal
conclusion with regard to the Progress/Violation Report filed in the District Court file on May
28, 1996, is that it is not, legally, an order extending probation but simply a "10(b)" report at
the close of probation.
Further reason to conclude that the Progress/Violation Report is a "10(b)" report and
not an order is that an "order" must be entered pursuant to a "motion". See Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(a). Further, Rule 12(c ) requires that if there are any factual
issues involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on fact on the record.
See Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12(c). In the instant case, there are no findings
of fact entered on the record.
Finally, Utah Code § 77-18-l(10)(a)(iii) gives the Prosecutor, the victim and the Court
the right to make motions to revoke probation. The form of the motion is identified as an
"Order to Show Cause". See Utah Code Section § 77-18-l(10)(a)(iii). But, Utah Code
Section § 77-18-1 does not contemplate probation officer's making "motion" in the form of
Progress/Violation Reports. Instead, pursuant to Utah Code Section § 77-18-l(10)(b),
probation officers are to notify prosecutors, who in turn, can file an Order to Show Cause.
See Utah Code Section § 77-18-l(10)(b) and 12(b).
Since the Court did not enter an order extending Defendant's probation before
Defendant's probation expired by the terms of the order entered on January 6, 1995, and the
proceedings to extend Defendant's probation were not commenced before the Court was
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without jurisdiction to revoke Defendant's probation and impose the sentence on June 27th,
1997.
An order entered placing a Defendant on probation expires by its own terms unless the
Court legally, properly, and constitutionally, enters a subsequent order which revokes,
modifies or extends. See Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 793 (Utah 1990). Otherwise,
"Defendant's would be left in a perpetual state of limbo". State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462, 464
(Utah 1988).
In "order for a court to retain its authority over a probationer who is not actively
evading supervision, the probationer must be served with the order to show cause with the
period of probation." Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 794 (Utah 1990). A probationer is
entitled to prior notice of the extension proceedings and a hearing before the court has the
authority to extend probation. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995). If no
such notice is given and a hearing held, the court lacks authority to extend probation. IcL
In the instant case, the probation revocation proceedings are never properly
commenced before the trial court lacks authority to extend Defendant's probation. Thus, the
Court attempt to revoke probation and impose Defendant's sentence pursuant to the June 27,
1997 hearing, is null and void. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah App.
1995). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order signed by the Court on
June 30, 1997, which revoked probation and imposed the one to fifteen year sentence, and on
remand, order the district court to dismiss the case.

POINT III: If, legally, an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's
probation on July 6, 1996, then:

(1)

Whether the order was an invalid extension of Defendant's
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probation given that the Court did not enter the order extending
Defendant's probation within the limits imposed by the
legislature?

(2)

Given that the extension order was not entered within the limits
imposed by the legislature, whether Defendant's probation
terminated before the entry of a valid order of extension?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether the trial court had the authority to extend

Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IcL at 1067.

1.

Order extending Defendant's probation was not entered within the
limits imposed by the legislature.

The power to revoke probation must be exercised within legislatively established limits.
State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988). The trial Court's power to grant, modify, or
revoke probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters,
the court's discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature. Smith v.
Cook. 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court lacks
jurisdiction to revoke probation when it acts outside the scope of its legislative authority.

2

2

Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 791 (1990){citing State v. Green,
757 P.2d
462, 464 (Utah 1988); State v. Cowdell. 626 P.2d 487,
488 (Utah 1981).
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A.

The Court was not presented the "probation extension" question, as
required by Utah Code Section 77-18-1. and thus, did not enter a valid
order.

The controlling statute is Utah Code § 77-18-l(12)(b), which requires that:

"(i)

Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to
constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that authorized
probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified.

(ii)

If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on
the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit and an order
to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or
extended."
(Emphasis added.)

Under the statute, after the Court, in considering an affidavit, determines there is
probable cause to warrant an extension of probation, then the Court sets a hearing. See Utah
Code § 77-18-l(12)(c)(I). "The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing." Utah
Code § 77-18-l(12)(c)(I).
The statute further requires the order to show cause inform the defendant of his rights,
including: (1) the right "to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to appoint counsel for
him if he is indigent"; and (2) the right "to present evidence".

Utah Code § 77-18-

l(12)(c)(iii) and (iv).
The statute requires the Defendant, at the hearing before the Court, "admit or deny the
allegations of the affidavit."

Utah Code § 77-18-l(12)(d)(I). If the Defendant's denies the
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allegations, then the prosecutor has the burden of proof and must present evidence. Utah
Code § 77-18-1(12)(d)(ii). In a probation revocation, modification, or extension hearing, the
Court must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was willful. State
v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994). A finding of willfulness merely requires a
finding that the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the conditions of his
probation. IcL
The statute gives the Defendant the right to cross examine witnesses against him and to
"call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence".

Utah Code §

77-18-l(12)(d)(iii).
As the record demonstrates, the above requirements were not met in this case. No
affidavit was filed, nor did the Court make a determination the probable cause existed to
believe that Mr. MARTIN violated the terms of his probation. (District Court File, pages 80 83,). Instead, a "Progress/Violation Report" was filed with the Court. (District Court File,
pages 80 - 83). At the end of the Progress/Violation Report the document has the words,
"APPROVED AND ORDERED:". (District Court File, pages 80 - 83, and Exhibit 2) After
the words "APPROVED AND ORDERED", Pat Jones, a Court Clerk, wrote the words 7s/
FGN". Besides the Progress/Violation Report, no other evidence was considered by Judge
Noel before he directed his clerk, Pat Jones, to place the letters "/s/FGN" on the
Progress/Violation Report. Further, Judge Noel did not make any findings of fact, whether
oral or written, on record regarding the Progress/Violation Report filed on May 28, 1996.
(Transcript of May 8th hearing, 27:25 - 28:8).

R,

The Court was not presented with a valid wavier, as required
by Utah Code Section 77-18-1. and thus, did not enter a valid order.
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Attached to the Progress/Violation Report (District Court File, Page 82) was a
"WAIVER OF PERSONAL APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COURT."

Utah Code § 77-18-l(12)(a) further provides that:

"(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in Court that the probationer
has violated the conditions of probation." (Emphasis Added,)
Thus, this Court must determine what is required to comply with the statute to extend
by waiver. In interpreting the meaning of "extended except upon waiver", this Court is to
give primary consideration in statutory construction "to give effect to the legislature's intent.
To discover that intent, this court looks first to the plain language of the statute.

Only when

the Statute is ambiguous will this Court seek guidance from the legislative history and policy
considerations."

State v. Winward. 907 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah App. 1995).

This Court considered what was required to extend probation by waiver in State v.
Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995). In Rawlings. the Court considered whether
extension proceedings were conducted in accordance with the provisions of Utah Code § 7718-1 given that the Defendant was not given proper notice of the hearing. IdLat 1067.
This Court held that a probationer in the State of Utah is accorded a measure of due
process at a probation extension proceeding and is thus entitled to the available protections.3
3

State v. Rawlinqs. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1 9 9 5 ) { c i t i n g
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 381 (1987), and
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex.
442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979). In
support of its holding the Court
of Appeals noted that Utah Code Section 77-18-1(10) (c) created an
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Id.

In Rawlings. the Court noted that in Smith v. Cook, the Supreme Court stated that

because the probationer was not given notice of the revocation proceedings before the
probation period expired, the Supreme Court held that the trial court lacked the authority to
revoke the probationer's probation. IcL at 1068. In Rawlings. the Court analogized that
"while Smith involved statutory prerequisites to commencement of a probation revocation
proceeding, the same analysis is applicable to commencement of probation extension
proceedings." ML
Thus, a probationer is entitled to proper notice of the extension proceedings and a
hearing before the court has the authority to extend probation. IcL at 1069. "If no such
notice is given and a hearing held, the court lacks the authority to extend the probation period
because the trial court's discretion to extend probation 'must be exercised within the limits
imposed by the legislature.'" Id.
Further, a "Defendant may waive his or her constitutional right to due process.
However, 'under the due process clause, [a defendant is] entitled to have [adequate notice]
imparted to him [or her]; that he [or she] might make an intelligent and informed decision as
to whether to waive his [or her] constitutional right to a . . . hearing." State v. Rawlings 893
P.2d at 1070, quoting Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep't. 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980).
Thus, in order for defendant to have effectively waived his due process right to proper notice
and a hearing on the extension issues, the waiver must be knowing. IcL
In the instant case, Defendant MARTIN did not receive proper notice of the extension

expectation on behalf of the probationer of notice of the
extension proceedings and a hearing, and that it was that
statutory expectation, 10(c), to which due process protection
attach. The legislature has amended Utah Code Section 77-181(10) and deleted 10(c). However, the expectation of liberty
interest is still created by Utah Code Section 77-18-1(12)(b),
and thus, the State v. Rawlings analysis still holds valid.
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proceedings, did not receive a hearing, and did not enter a knowing and intelligent waiver in
front of a neutral detached decision maker. Thus, the waiver was not intelligent and knowing.
At the May 21st meeting, Probation Officer Anderson showed Mr. MARTIN the
waiver form, (See District Court File, page 82), which was the third page of Exhibit 3.
(Transcript, May 8th Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14). Probation Officer Anderson did not show
Mr. MARTIN the Progress/Violation Report, or discuss the contents of the Progress/Violation
Report which is found in the District Court File, at pages 82, 83. (Transcript, May 8th
Hearing, page 7:19 - 8:14, and May 8th hearing, Exhibit 2, pages 1,2)
The Waiver Form states that "I Caprice Martin . . . do hereby voluntarily request that
my personal appearance before the Third District Court be waived and that my probation
supervision be extended; AND/OR that the conditions of my probation be amended as
follows:" (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3). Then,
the document continues in handwritten language that "Probation extended 12 months from July
6, 1996, for payment of remaining fine balance and completion of substance abuse
counseling." (District Court File, page 82, and Exhibit 2 from May 8th hearing, page 3).
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never made aware that he had the
right to receive advice from an attorney. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:13 -18).
Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to
require the probation office to show probable cause before he could be held on a hearing for
violation of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 23). Before signing the
Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he was entitled to a neutral officer making
a determination of whether probable cause existed that Mr. MARTIN violated his probation.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 13:19 - 14:4). Before signing the Waiver Form, Mr.
MARTIN was never informed that Adult Probation and Parole had the burden of proof to
show that he willfully violated his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:5 - 14:9).
24

Before signing the Waiver form, Mr. MARTIN was never advised that he had the right to
speak out and present evidence in his own behalf at a probation revocation hearing.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 14:10 - 14).
Probation Officer Anderson testified that, at the May 21st meeting, Mr. MARTIN was
never shown an Order to Show Cause or Affidavit asserting that Mr. MARTIN violated the
terms of his probation. (Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 7:25 - 8:11, 13:9 - 13). The only
persons in attendance at the May 21st meeting were Glade Anderson and CAPRICE MARTIN.
(Transcript of May 8th Hearing, 10:12-15). On May 21, 1996, the only probation condition
that had not yet been met was the verification of payment of the fine and verification of
substance abuse counseling. Everything else was done.

(Transcript of May 8th Hearing,

9:14-19).
Given the facts stated above, Defendant MARTIN did not enter a knowing and
intelligent waiver as is required and contemplated by Utah Code § 77-18-1.

2.

Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid order
extending probation.

In the instant case, the probation revocation proceedings are never properly
commenced before the trial court lacks authority to extend Defendant's probation. Thus, the
Court attempt to revoke probation and impose Defendant's sentence pursuant to the June 27,
1997 hearing, is null and void. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah App.
1995). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order signed by the Court on
June 30, 1997, which revoked probation and imposed the one to fifteen year sentence, and, on
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remand, order the district court to dismiss the case.

POINT IV:

If an order was entered prior to the expiration of Defendant's probation
on July 6, 1996, and the order was entered within the limits imposed by
the legislature and the due process requirement of the Utah Constitution,
then:

(1)

Whether, in entering the order, the Court violated the
Defendant's procedural due process rights as outlined in the 5th
and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution?

(2)

Given that the order was not entered within the requirements of
the 5th and 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, whether
Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid
order of extension?

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether the trial court had the authority to extend

Defendant MARTIN'S probation is a question of law. State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063,
1066 (Utah App. 1995). The Appellate Court accords a trial court's conclusions of law no
particular deference, reviewing them for correctness. IdLat 1067.

"The Due Process Clause applies when government action deprives a person of liberty
or property; accordingly, when there is a claimed denial of due process [the U.S. Supreme
Court has] inquired into the nature of the individual's claimed interest. Greenhotz v. Inmates
of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex. 442 U.S. 2, 7, 99 S.Ct., 2100, 2103 (1979).
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"To determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, [the Court] must
look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." Board of Regents v. Roth.
408 U.S. 564, 570-571, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705-2706 (1972). This has meant that to obtain a
protectable right "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it." IcL at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709.

A.

Defendant MARTIN'S Liberty Interest which is entitled to Due Process
Protections.

The U.S. Supreme Court examined the "nature" of the "liberty interest" involved in
parole revocations in the case, Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972).
The Court notes that "the essence of parole is release from prison before the completion of
sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the
sentence. IcL at 477, 92 S.Ct. at 2598.

To accomplish the purpose of parole, those who are

allowed to leave prison early are subjected to specified conditions for the duration of their
terms. IcL at 478, 92 S.Ct. at 2598. Thus, the nature of the liberty interest in a parole
revocation is that a "[Revocation deprives an individual, not of absolute liberty to which every
citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of
special parole restrictions." IcL at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600. In Gagnonv. Scarpelli. 411 U.S.
778 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held that there was no difference in the "liberty interest"
for purposes of revoking parole or revoking probation. IcL at 781, 93 S.Ct. at 1759.
In the instant case, the liberty interest is "absolute liberty" as opposed to the
"conditional liberty" of parole and probation. On July 6, 1996, Defendant MARTIN'S
probation was set to expire. At that time, Defendant MARTIN would no longer have
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"conditional liberty", that is liberty "properly dependant on observance of special parole
restrictions."4 Defendant MARTIN would have "absolute liberty to which every citizen is
entitled." Id

Thus, part, but not all, of the nature of the liberty interest taken from

Defendant MARTIN by the probation extension is that, without the extension, Defendant
MARTIN would have thrown off the burdens of "conditional liberty" in favor of "absolute
liberty". This Court has held that concerning "probation extensions" as outlined in Utah Code
Section 77-18-1, Defendant's had a liberty interest that was entitled to due process
protections. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1995).
Further, by statute, Defendant MARTIN was given other rights before his probation
could be extended.

These rights include: (1) the right to have the prosecutor file of an

affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of
probation; (2) the right to have the Court determine whether probable cause exists to believe
that extension of probation is justified; (3) if probable cause is determined, the right to be
served with a copy of the affidavit and an order to show; (4) the right to a hearing, not less
than five days after being served with the Order to Show Cause, in which the Order to Show
Cause is considered; (5) the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have the
Court appoint counsel for the Defendant if he is indigent; (6) the right to present evidence at
the hearing; (7) the right to have the prosecutor meet his burden of proof with evidence

4

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 260. The U.S
Supreme Court noted that these "special parole conditions" were
"typically" restrictions like forbidding parolees to use liquor
or to have associations or correspondence with certain categories
of undesirable persons. Parolees must seek permission from
their parole officers before changing employment, changing living
quarters, acquiring or operating a motor vehicle, traveling
outside the community, or incurring indebtedness. Additionally,
parolees must regularly report to the parole officer. Id. at
478, 92 S.Ct. 2598.
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establishing that, by a preponderance of the evidence, the violation of probation was willful;
and (8) the right to cross examine witnesses against him and to call witnesses, appear and
speak in his own behalf, and present evidence. See Utah Code § 77-18-1(12) and. State v.
Peterson. 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah App. 1994). The above-listed rights, established by
statute, create an expectation and it is this statutory expectation to which due process
protections attach. See Board of Pardons v. Allen. 482 U.S. 369, 381, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2422
(1987).
Thus, in the instant case, Defendant's MARTIN'S liberty interest which is entitled to
Due Process protections, is both, the right to be free of the restrictions of probation and the
rights listed above, number one through eight. Before that liberty interest could be taken from
Defendant MARTIN, Defendant MARTIN was entitled to Due Process protections.5

IL

The procedures Martin is entitled to before losing the above-described
liberty interest.

In determining what procedures are necessary to safeguard Defendant MARTIN'S
liberty interest, the U.S. Supreme Court has set out three factors which must be considered in
this case. Those factors were enunciated in Matthews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct.

5

In State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), this
Court held that Utah Code Section 77-18-1(10) (c) granted
Defendants on probation the right to a hearing with proper
notice
before probation could be extended for good cause shown. Since
the Rawlings decision, the legislature has stricken Utah Code
Section 10( c) from 77-18-1. However, this does not change the
Rawlings analysis because Utah Code Section 77-18-1(12), with a
great deal of particularity, grants probationer ua hearing and
proper notice" and requires "good cause shown" before probations
can be extended.
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893(1976), and they are:

"[1]

the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

[2]

the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally,

[3]

the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.

In Gagnon, the U.S. Supreme Court, in a very similar situation to the instant case, had
to determine what were the appropriate procedures to safeguard a probationer's liberty interest
in continuing on probation without revocation. Gagnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct.
1756 (1973). In Gagnon. the Court noted that:
"Revocation . . .is, if anything, commonly treated as a failure of supervision. While
presumably it would be inappropriate for a field agent never to revoke, the whole thrust of the
probation-parole movement is to keep men in the community, working with adjustment
problems there, and using revocation only as a last resort when treatment has failed or is about
to fail." Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. at 1761.6
Justice Powell, for the unanimous Supreme Court, further writes that "[e]ven though
the [probation] officer is not by [his] recommendation [to revoke probation] converted into a
prosecutor committed to convict, his role as counselor to the probationer or parolee is then

6

quoting Remington,

Newman,

Kimball,

Melli

& Goldstein.

Criminal

Justice Administration. Materials and Cases, 910 (1969) .
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surely compromised. When the [probation] officer's view of the probationer's or parolee's
conduct differs in this fundamental way from the latter's own view, due process requires that
the difference be resolved before revocation becomes final. Both the probationer or parolee
and the State have interests in the accurate finding of fact and the informed use of discretion the probationer or parolee to insure that his liberty is not unjustifiably taken away and the
State to make certain that is neither unnecessarily interrupting a successful effort at
rehabilitation nor imprudently prejudicing the safety of the community. IcL
In this case, the central question is whether a Defendant's probation should be extended
beyond the term previously determined by the Court to be an adequate period of time to
rehabilitate the Defendant.
The probationer has an interest in being able to successfully complete probation, be
done with the requirements and expenses of rehabilitative classes and constrains on movement
and associations, and return to the normal life of "absolute liberty". Society has an interest in
ceasing the costs, and the administrative and judicial burdens in supervising another
probationer. When a probation officer determines that probation should be extended, his
view point is in conflict with that of the probationer, and possibly, society's interest in ceasing
the burden of administration.
Thus, given the similar concerns and interests as outlined in Gagnon. the procedures
for the extension of probation should be the same as the procedures for revocation of probation
as outlined in Gagnon.
In Gagnon. the U.S. Supreme Court required that a neutral detached decision maker
preside over two hearings. Gagnon 411 U.S. at 785, 93 S.Ct. 1760-1. One hearing to
determine whether probable cause exists to determine that the Probationer violated the terms of
his probation. And the Second hearing to determine whether a probationer has in fact acted in
violation of one or more conditions of his probation, and then, whether the probationer's
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sentence should be imposed or whether he should be returned to probation. IcL_
Further, the probationer was entitled to (a) written notice of the claimed violations of
probation; (b) disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him; ( c) the opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional
parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.
Id at 786, 93S.Ct. 1761-62.7

2.

Defendant's probation terminated before the entry of a valid order of
extension.

A.

The Court's non-compliance with the requirements of the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution..

As the record demonstrates, the Gagnon procedural requirements were not met in this
case. The record farther demonstrates the Trial Court in extending Defendant MARTIN'S
7

As outlined in Utah Code § 77-18-1(12), the procedures required
for extending probation are the same as the procedures required
in Gagnon to revoke probations.
See Gagnon. 411 U.S. at 785-6,
93 S.Ct. at 1760-2 and Utah Code § 77-18-1(12).
The procedures
outlined in Utah Code § 77-18-1(12) are also the same procedures
required by Gagnon. This makes sense since most of the conflicts
between the probationer and the probation officer are the same in
both revocation proceedings and extension proceedings. Further,
many of the concerns that both the probationer has, and society
has, are very similar in both extensions and revocations.
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probation, did not comply with the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
No affidavit was filed. Also, the Court did not determine that probable cause existed
to believe that Mr. MARTIN violated the terms of his probation. (District Court File, pages
80 - 83, ). Instead, a "Progress/Violation Report" was filed with the Court. (District Court
File, pages 80 - 83). At the end of the Progress/Violation Report the document has the words,
"APPROVED AND ORDERED:". (District Court File, pages 80 - 83, and Exhibit 2) After
the words "APPROVED AND ORDERED", Pat Jones, a Court Clerk, wrote the words 7s/
FGN". Besides the Progress/Violation Report, no other evidence was considered by Judge
Noel before he directed his clerk, Pat Jones, to place the letters 7s/FGN" on the
Progress/Violation Report. Further, Judge Noel did not make any findings of fact, whether
oral or written, on record regarding the Progress/Violation Report filed on May 28, 1996.
(Transcript of May 8th hearing, 27:25 - 28:8).

R,

Defendant's Martin's ineffective waiver of his Due Process
Rights.

Further, the Defendant MARTIN did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Due
Process rights under the U.S. Constitution.
Under the Due Process clause, a person is entitled to have the essential information
imparted to him so that he can make an intelligent and informed decision as to whether to
waive his constitutional right. See Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598,
602 (1980)(interpreting the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.)
Defendant MARTIN did not receive proper notice of the extension proceedings, did not
receive the essential information to make an informed decision whether to waive his rights, did
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not receive a hearing, and did not receive a neutral decision maker determining whether the
waiver was knowing and intelligent at the time it was made.
Gagnon's procedures require: (1) written notice of the claimed violations of probation;
(2) disclosure to the probationer of the evidence against him; (3) the presence of a neutral and
detached hearing body or decision maker during the waiver of one's Due Process rights; (4) a
full disclosure of Defendant's rights that he is waiving; (4) a written statement by the hearing
body or decision maker as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for extending probation.
SeeGagnon411 U.S. at 785-6, 93 S.Ct. 1760-2.
The facts of this case demonstrate that Defendant MARTIN was not given his Due
Process rights during the waiver of his Due Process Rights, and thus, the waiver was
ineffective.

C.

Since the Trial Court did not comply with the procedural requirements
of the U.S. Constitution for extending probations, this Court should
vacate the sentence imposed at the June 27th hearing.

In the instant case, the probation revocation proceedings are never properly
commenced before the trial court lacks authority to extend Defendant's probation. Thus, the
Court attempt to revoke probation and impose Defendant's sentence pursuant to the June 27,
1997 hearing, is null and void. See State v. Rawlings. 893 P.2d 1063, 1071 (Utah App.
1995). For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the order signed by the Court on
June 30, 1997, which revoked probation and imposed the one to fifteen year sentence, and on
remand, order the district court to dismiss the case.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT

Based on the foregoing, this Court of Appeals should determine that Defendant
MARTIN'S probation was not legally and constitutionally extended. Thus, by operation of the
order of January 6, 1995, Defendant's MARTIN'S probation expired on July 6, 1996. Thus,
the Court was without jurisdiction to conduct any further proceedings after July 6, 1996. Any
and all revocations, extensions, and modifications, to Defendant MARTIN'S probation after
July 6, 1996, are null and void. Thus, this Court should remand this case to the District
Court, with an order requiring the District Court to vacate its order signed on June 30, 1997,
and to enter and order of dismissal.

REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT

Oral argument is desired in this case as the issues raised are significant.

Dated this

day of June, 1998

Gregory M^^Konstantino
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF was, this 2 ?

day of June, 1998, mailed first class,

postage-prepaid to:
Utah Attorney General's Office
Heber Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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Appendix A.
A.

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

B.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

C.

Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

D.

Utah Code Section 77-18-1.

E.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 12.
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AMENDMENT V—GRAND JURY INDICTMENT FOR CAPITAL
CRIMES; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION;
DUE PROCESS OF LAW; JUST COMPENSATION FOR
PROPERTY
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
HISTORICAL NOTES
Proposal and Ratification
were ratified on December 15, 1791.
Thefirstten amendments to the Con- For the states which ratified these
stitution were proposed to the Legisla- amendments, and the dates of rattures of the several states by the First ification, see Historical Notes under
Congress on September 25, 1789, and Amendment I.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
WESTLAW supplements U.S.C.A. electronically and is useful for additional
research. Enter a citation in INSTA-CITE for display of parallel citations
and case history. Enter a constitution, statute or rule citation in a case law
database for cases of interest.
Example query for INSTA-CITE: 790 F.2d 978
Example query for United States Constitution: (first +6 amendment) +s
religion
Example query for statute: "42 U.S.C.*" +4 1983
Also, see the WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this
volume.

A m e n d m e n t V.

Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; * *
7
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AMENDMENT XIV—CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION
OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Materials for the Due Process Clause of Section 1 are set out in
this volume and the following volume. See preceding volume
for materials pertaining to the Citizenship and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses of that section and the volume containing
the end of the Constitution for materials pertaining to the
Equal Protection Clause of that section and Sections 2 to 5.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States, according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel£

Amend. 14

CITIZENSHIP, ETC.

lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
HISTORICAL NOTES
Proposal and Ratification.
This amendment was proposed to the
legislatures of the several States by the
Thirty-ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866.
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and
transmitted to the Department of State a
concurrent resolution, declaring that
"the legislatures of the States of Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon,
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa,
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana,
being three-fourths and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified
the fourteenth article of amendment to
the Constitution of the United States,
duly proposed by two-thirds of each
House of the Thirty-ninth Congress:
Therefore, Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby declared to be a
part of the Constitution of the United
States, and it shall be duly promulgated
as such by the Secretary of State." The
Secretary of State accordingly issued a
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, declaring that the proposed fourteenth
amendment had been ratified by the legislatures of thirty of the thirty-six States.
The amendment was ratified by the State
Legislatures on the following dates:
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19,
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30,
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York,
Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867;
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia,

Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867;
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan.
19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867;
Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan.
25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867;
Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania,
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20,
1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa,
Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868;
Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina,
July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868;
South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama,
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868.
Subsequent to the proclamation the following States ratified this amendment:
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan.
17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland* Apr. 4,
1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976.
The Fourteenth Amendment originally
was rejected by Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas and Virginia. However, the State
Legislatures of the aforesaid States subsequently ratified the amendment on the
dates set forth in the preceding paragraph. Kentucky and Maryland rejected
this amendment on Jan. 10, 1867 and
Mar. 23, 1867, respectively.
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and
Oregon "withdrew" their consent to the
ratification of this amendment on Mar.
24, 1868, Jan. 15, 1868, and Oct. 15,
186S, respectively.
The State of New Jersey expressed
support for the amendment on Nov. 12,
1980.
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Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=>
83(1), 121 to 123.

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compilers Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law <s=» 82;
Weapons <$=> 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec, 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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THE JUDGMENT

PART 3
DEFENDANTS PLEADING NOT GUILTY BY REASON OF
INSANITY
77-16a-301. Mental examination of defendant.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
The privilege against self-incrimination does
not protect defendants pleading guilty by reason of insanity from examination under this
section. However, the prosecution may use in-

formation from the examination only to rebut
defendants' insanity claims but not to otherwise establish guilt. State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d
359 (Utah 1995).

CHAPTER 17
THE TRIAL
77-17-1. Doubt as to degree — Conviction only on lowest.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — When should jury's deliberation
proceed from charged offense to lesser-included
offense, 26 A.L.R.5th 603.

77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice — Instruct ion to jury.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Sufficiency of corroboration of confession for purpose of establishing corpus delicti as question of law or fact, 33 A.L.R.5th 571.

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-3.
77-18-6.5.
77-18-8.3.

Section
Suspension of sentence — Pleas
held in abeyance — Probation
— Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings — Electronic
monitoring.
Disposition of fines.
Liability of rescued person for
costs of emergency response.
Special condition of sentence

77-18-8.5.
77-18-10.

77-18-11.

77-18-12.

during incarceration — Penalty.
Special condition of probation —
Penalty.
Petition — Expungement of
records of arrest, investigation, and detention — Eligibility conditions — No filing
fee.
Petition — Expungement of
conviction — Certificate of eligibility — Notice — Written
evaluation — Objections —
Hearing.
Grounds for denial of certificate
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(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant:
(a) may be required to perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in community service restitution programs, including the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4); and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997, shall be required to:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
i
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department, upon order of the court, shall collect and disburse fines,
restitution with interest in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4), and any
other costs assessed under Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection 77-18-1(10).
(10) (a) (i) Probationmay be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench
probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines,
restitution, including interest, if any, in accordance with Subsection
76-3-201(4), and other amounts outstanding.
(iii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own
motion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his
failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed.
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(b) The department shall notify the sentencing court and prosecuting
attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termination of supervised
probation will occur by law. The notification shall include a probation
progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines,
restitution, and other amounts outstanding.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
w a r r a n t by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court t h a t the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe t h a t revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a w a r r a n t for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.

77-18-1
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(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) Restitution imposed under this chapter and interest accruing in accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4) is considered a debt for willful and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as
provided in Title 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 523, 1985.
(14) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection.
(15) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
|
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(16) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (17).
(17) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
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(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(hi) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, e n a c t e d by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, c h . 59, § 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, c h . 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, c h . 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, c h . 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, c h . 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, c h . 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, c h . 198, § 1;1994,
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch.
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, c h . 301, § 3;
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, c h . 352, § 6; 1996,
ch. 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1995 amendment by ch. 20, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Subsections 76-3-201(4) and (5)" for
"Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4)" in Subsection
(8)(i) and replaced "Chapter 1" with "Chapter 2"
in Subsection (15).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 117, effective
May 1, 1995, added references to "interest in
accordance with Subsection 76-3-201(4)" in
Subsections (5)(c), (8)(i), (9)(a), UOHaXii), and
(13), deleted a reference to Subsection 76-3201(3) in Subsection (8)(i), corrected a reference
in Subsection (15), and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 184, effective
May 1, 1995, deleted a requirement of a "recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by
the defendant" in Subsection (5)(b)(ii); rewrote
Subsection (6), making significant stylistic
changes, decreasing the time t h a t the presentence investigation m u s t be available before
trial, which had been ten days, and adding the
possibility of a ten-day period to correct inaccuracies in the report; and added "and disbursement" after "collection" in Subsection (9)(a).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 301, effective
May 1, 1995, substituted "the recommended
amount of complete restitution" for "pecuniary

damages," inserted "as defined in Subsection
76-3-201(4)" twice and inserted "court-ordered"
in Subsection (5)(a) and rewrote Subsection (9).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 337, effective
May 1, 1995, added "which may include the use
of electronic monitoring" at the end of Subsection (8)(f), added Subsections (16) and (17), and
corrected a statutory reference in Subsection
(15).
The 1995 amendment by ch. 352, effective
May 1, 1995, inserted "if the defendant is not
represented by counsel" in the first sentence of
Subsection (6), substituted "protected" for "private" and "Chapter (2)" for "Chapter (1)" in the
first sentence of Subsection (15), added Subsection (15He), and made related stylistic changes.
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, substituted "protected" for "confidential"
in Subsection (5)(d).
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
subdivided Subsection (8), made related designation changes, and added Subsection (8Kb).
Compiler's N o t e s . — Laws 1994, S.J.R. 6
proposed amending Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 12
and proposed adding a new Sec. 28 to that
article. These proposals were approved by the
voters, the changes to take effect on J a n u a r y 1,
1995. Laws 1994, ch. 198, which amended this
section to add the requirement of a victim
impact statement, provides in § 16 that the
Legislature intends the act to serve as the
implementing legislation of those constitutional amendments.
C o o r d i n a t i o n c l a u s e . — Laws 1995, ch.
184, § 5 directs that the amendments in that
act to Subsection (6)(a) of this section shall
supersede the amendments to the sme subsection in L. 1995, ch. 352.
Laws 1995, ch. 301, § 6 provides that the
amendments in that act to Subsections (5)(b)(ii)
and (9)(a) supersede the amendments to the
same subsections by ch. 184.
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der the clearly erroneous standard; (2) reviewing the trial court's ultimate conclusion that
Rule 11 was violated and any subsidiary legal
conclusions under the correction of error standard; and (3) reviewing the trial court's determination as to the type and amount of sanction
to be imposed under the abuse of discretion
standard. Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229
(Utah 1992); Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761
(Utah Ct. App. 1996).
The determination of whether conduct vio-
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lates Rule 11 is made on an objective basis.
Giffen v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App.
1996).
Cited in Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d
1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Rimensburger v.
Rimensburger, 841 P.2d 709 (Utah Ct. App.
1992); Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d 876 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994).
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections.
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless otherwise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed
by order of the court:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten
days after notice of the court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of
the more definite statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
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ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for
relief. I£ on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such
order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this
rule.
(h) Weaver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
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(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be
deemed a waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff m an
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for
payment of such costs and charges as tnay be awarded against such plaintiff.
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the
United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 12, F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Motions generally,
U.R.C.P. 7.
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Jurisdiction over the person.
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Rights of opposing party.
Motion for more definite statement.
—Bill of particulars.
—Criteria.
—Motion to dismiss distinguished.
—Purpose.
Delay.
Obtaining evidence.
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
—Explained.
—Improper.
—Standard.
—Standard of review.
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue.
—Forum-selection clause in contract.
Presentation of defenses.
—How presented.
Affirmative defenses.
Divorce.
Election of remedies.
Failure to state claim upon which relief
can be granted.
General and special appearances.
Statute of frauds.
N eime.
—When presented.
Amended answer.
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff.
—Failure to file.
Summary judgment.
—Conversion of motion to dismiss.
—Court's discretion.
—Court's initiative.
—Defenses.
—Opportunity to present pertinent material.
—Preclusion.
Issues of fact.
Waiver of defenses.
—Defect of parties.
—Defective service of process.

—Exceptions.
Subject matter jurisdiction.
When issues raised.
—Failure to join indispensable party.
—"Failure to pay consideration.
—Mutual mistake.
—Statute of frauds.
—Statute of limitations.
—Waiver.
Cited.
Jurisdiction over the person.
When urging the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction based only on documentary
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima
facie showing that the trial court has personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S.
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991).
Motion for judgment on pleadings.
—Matters outside of pleadings.
Answers to interrogatories.
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the
pleadings and if the court considers them the
other party must have the privilege of offering
answering affidavits as upon a motion for summary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v.
Wffley, 1 \5tah 2h 254, 2B5 P.2a 422 (1953).
Rights of opposing party.
On review of a motion on the pleadings
treated as a motion for summary judgment under Subdivision (c), the party against whom
the judgment has been granted is entitled to
have all the facts presented, and all the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas
Co., 8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P.2d 1099 (1958).
Motion for more definite statement
—Bill of particulars.
A motion for a more definite statement, and
not discovery procedures, is the appropriate
means of obtaining the information formerly

